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I. Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2010 has generated calls for conceptual 
re-examination of regulatory policy, its attitude towards the efficiency of 
markets and the role of legal, social, and ethical norms in a market economy.1 
It has prompted policymakers and scholars to re-examine the assumptions 
underlying a variety of the legal arena’s current neoclassical economic 
theories and the goals of regulatory agendas.2 It has also been claimed that a 
great number of today’s economic and environmental problems reflect 
regulatory failures and inadequate regulatory oversight.3  
Legal scholars specializing in various fields of regulation have echoed the 
assumption that domestic regulatory policies must incorporate more of the 
                                                        
1 What went Wrong with Economics, Economist, July 18, 2009, 11-12; see also JOHN CASSI-
DY, How Markets Fail. The Logic of Economic Calamities, New York 2009. 
2 The Other-Worldly Philosophers, Economist, July 18, 2009, 65-67; GEORGE A. AKERLOF/ 
ROBERT J. SHILLER, Animal Spirits. How human psychology drives the economy and why 
it matters for global capitalism, Princeton 2009; ROGER ZÄCH, Gefährdung des wirtschaft-
lichen Wohlstands durch ergebnisorientierte Wirtschaftsordnung, Kommentar, Wirtschaft 
und Wettbewerb 2010, 139. 
3 RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, Fault Lines. How hidden fractures still threaten the world economy, 
Princeton 2010, 154-182; see also e.g. CHRISTINE A. VARNEY, Vigorous Antitrust Enforce-
ment in this Challenging Era, May 12, 2009, 4-5, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
speeches/2457 77.htm.; see also the discussions of the World Economic Forum in Davos 
2011: PHILIPP HILDEBRAND, President of the Swiss National Bank. 
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complexity which underlies the industrial economy.4 One debate that has 
remained latent over the last half-dozen years concerns the role of cost-
benefit analysis as a technique to render regulatory policy apparently more 
neutral and objective. Although conventional wisdom holds that cost-benefit 
analysis provides for a more ‘scientific’ approach to legal policy, Professor 
DOUGLAS A. KYSAR has recently written that cost-benefit analysis is “a 
policy-making approach that achieves its appearance of case-specific ration-
ality at the price of insensitivity to context and to longer-term, systemic 
rationality.” According to Kysar, “policymakers cannot be content with the 
local equilibriums identified by conventional cost-benefit analyses but in-
stead must aim to alter – over time and in rather dramatic macroscale ways – 
the economic and technological forces that combine to structure any given 
policy context with its microscale snapshot that seems to admit of only one 
‘optimal’ solution.”5 Professors RICHARD L. REVESZ and MICHAEL A. 
LIVERMORE echo this sentiment, with a slightly different emphasis, writing 
that “cost-benefit analysis is […] biased against regulation.” They ascribe 
“the roots of the antiregulatory bias within cost-benefit analysis” to “histori-
cal rather than conceptual” reasons and contend that they stem from “the 
shunning of cost-benefit analysis by proregulatory interests […] which had 
the unintended effect of leaving antiregulatory interests free to shape the use 
of the technique toward their purposes.”6 Numerous other scholars have 
engaged in the debate over the proper role of regulation in the economy 
arguing in favor and against the application of cost-benefit analysis on a 
variety of different grounds.7 
Outside of the academy, cost-benefit analysis is often used by govern-
ments to evaluate the desirability of a new regulatory framework or a given 
intervention in the free play of market forces. It is heavily used in govern-
ment today when deciding on whether a new business regulation should be 
introduced, a new road should be built, or a new drug should be offered 
through the state healthcare system. What is more, the assumption that the 
principle of cost-benefit analysis allows us to analyze what might happen 
under varying policies and conditions with respect to social or economic 
welfare may seem so intuitive that for the most part scholars have failed to 
test the application of the welfare-maximization approach against the ques-
                                                        
4 Cf. DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, The Jurisprudence of Experimental Law and Economics, 163 J. 
Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 2007, 187. 
5 DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, Regulating from Nowhere. Environmental Law and the Search for 
Objectivity X, New Haven 2010. 
6 RICHARD A. REVESZ/MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, Retaking Rationality. How Cost-Benefit 
Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health, Oxford 2008, 10. 
7 For a recent sustained critique, arguing that cost-benefit analysis is fundamentally flawed, 
see FRANK ACKERMAN/LISA HINZERLING, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything 
and the Value of Nothing, New York/London 2005. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Regulation – Cornerstones of a Reality-Based Regulatory Policy 
655 
tion of whether it provides for useful simplifications or oversimplifications. 
In the context of the environmental, health and safety laws this has been 
recognized – because a value must be put on human life or on the environ-
ment: The cost-benefit principle requires us for example to install a guardrail 
on a dangerous stretch of mountain road if the dollar cost of doing so is less 
than the implicit dollar value of the injuries, deaths, and property damage 
thus prevented.8 
This argument yields important implications for the study of the relation 
of cost-benefit analysis to regulation in general. This contribution argues that 
the cost-benefit analysis principle may indeed create useful simplifications of 
the economy that allow us to analyze a vast number of market conditions, 
thus helping us to avoid devising the most realistic models that detail all 
individuals and their whimsical behavior, and all institutions, models that 
would be hopelessly complex and of little value in analysis. The cost-benefit 
principle has been used as a method for analyzing markets,9 as an apparently 
neutral technical apparatus for studying the relationship between competition 
and market outcomes and plays a pervasive role in relevant legal discourse.10 
It integrates the distinctive grammar of economics into the law, producing a 
richer conception of appropriate legal argument. However, we argue that the 
application of the wealth-maximization principle to regulation is not actually 
capable of pursuing an ‘economically correct regulatory policy’ that unre-
servedly allows us to investigate in economic relationships thoroughly, and 
that conclusively enables regulators to reduce welfare costs through decision 
errors by distinguishing better between welfare enhancing and welfare dimin-
ishing behavior. 
To claim that the wealth-maximization principle is based on a ‘scientific’ 
view of the economy and that it therefore always generates better outcomes 
or results or provides for a more objective regulatory framework is to fall 
victim to the illusion that through the application of a single value framework 
to reality, such as rational choice or welfarism, the necessity of making value 
judgments can be avoided.11 Rather, scientific theory points to the fact that 
                                                        
8 ROBERT H. FRANK, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. Legal Stud. 
(2000), 913. 
9 See STEVEN M. TELES, The rise of the conservative legal movement: The battle for control 
of the law (2008), 91. 
10 BRUCE A. ACKERMANN, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 6 Duke L.J. 
(1986) 929, 929-947. 
11 ADRIAN KÜNZLER, Effizienz oder Wettbewerbsfreiheit? Zur Frage nach den Aufgaben des 
Rechts gegen private Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, Tübingen 2008; see also WALTER OTT, 
Der Rechtspositivismus. Kritische Würdigung auf der Grundlage eines juristischen Pragma-
tismus, Berlin 1992; Efficiency and Beyond, Economist, July 18, 2009, 68-69; MAX 
WEBER, Die “Objektivität” sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, 
Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, 1904, 148-149; ALOIS RIKLIN, Ein über-
raschend junger Streit. Über vermeidbare und unvermeidbare Werturteile, 40 Die Neue 
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the economy and the legal decision-making environment may be too complex 
to support the level of purity and clarity that cost-benefit analysis alone is 
able to achieve with respect to the ultimate interpretation of results. Its exclu-
sive application ignores the facts that individual preferences are necessarily 
plural, that market outcomes are necessarily uncertain, and that legal judg-
ments are necessarily pragmatic. Within the context of realistic legal decision 
tasks, any attempt to replicate such research methodology may fail to capture 
what is distinctively complex about the assigned tasks; vested interests have 
to be confronted, conflicting aims have to be reconciled. Above all, the 
existence of ‘complex organized phenomena’ has to be acknowledged, as has 
the fact that effective government is a matter of getting the balance right 
between autonomy and coordination. Hence, policymakers and courts need to 
embrace the fact that cost-benefit analyses are based on pre-scientific deci-
sions, or, are axiomatic in character. Such analyses may not be judged – as is 
done in the natural or social sciences – on their ‘truth’, but on their effective-
ness in terms of the conclusions they permit to be drawn. Such a pragmatic 
jurisprudential framework presupposes a debate as to whether the conse-
quences of a particular method are desirable or undesirable. It sometimes 
offers a better conceptual fit for scientific approaches in law than the purely 
positivistic framework of social science and, at the same time, allows for 
careful consideration of constitutional rights and the idea that the preferences 
of the citizens should be the relevant normative criteria for appropriate deci-
sions about the objectives of regulatory policy. 
II. Implications of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The rigorous assumption from neoclassical welfare economics that 
governmental interventions in individual preferences are only justified when 
they demonstrably have a welfare-enhancing effect is based on the implicit 
view that “what we don’t know won’t hurt us”.12 However, in situations of 
uncertainty, this might mean to overlook unintended consequences. The Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) for example has made its risk-assessment 
burden lighter by suggesting that novel scientific processes in the case of 
cloning, genetic modification and nanoengineering are not in themselves 
cause for regulatory scrutiny or distinction. Rather, they should only become 
relevant if they lead to demonstrated differences in the physical or 
compositional characteristics of end products as compared to conventional 
                                                                                                                              
Ordnung (1986), 16; MATTHIAS MAHLMANN, Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie, Ba-
den-Baden 2010, 144-147. 
12 KYSAR (note 5), 91; see also REVESZ/LIVERMORE (note 6), 1. 
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counterparts.13 Introducing nanomaterials or genetically modified organisms 
widely into field environments however means ignoring the maybe 
irreversible nature of such actions.14 On the other hand, the proposition from 
advocates of neoclassical welfare economics to simply price and incorporate 
the value of this precaution into the welfare-economic optimization calculus 
so that cost-benefit analysis can continue in the usual way15 would “invite 
exclusionary, technocratic decision making in the face of grave uncertain 
collective choices, precisely the context that […] instead requires 
inclusiveness, transparency, and candid acknowledgment that ethical choices 
are being undertaken.”16 The veil of apparent scientific rigor, therefore, has to 
be lifted and the blunt reality of indeterminacy needs to be addressed. In 
situations of uncertainty, “the resulting permissive approach [that] comports 
well with the tendency of liberal market democracies to permit private action 
unless and until a public justification has been demonstrated [entails the 
problem that] this predisposition has been presented in a scientific vernacular, 
as an assumption about the empirical tendencies of nascent technologies, 
rather than as what it properly is – a preference for distributing the burden of 
uncertainty in a particular way, according to political values.”17 It is worth 
noting that such a permissive approach worked as long as human actions did 
not have irreversible consequences for mankind or the environment or no far- 
or even globally-reaching effects on the economy. Today, both in view of the 
environment and in light of the recent financial crisis, this is no longer the 
case. 
III. Regulating Complexity 
The view that analysts can maintain the classical scientific tradition, and 
refuse to accommodate the implications of complexity theory in the very 
scientific models that are used to generate ranges of costs and benefits, is 
hardly tenable if recent epistemological principles are given appropriate 
attention. In economic and social sciences, it is recognized today that a 
                                                        
13 See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and 
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 Harv. L. Rev. (2004), 525 with further references. 
14 KENNETH J. ARROW/ANTHONY C. FISHER, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and 
Irreversibility, 88 Q. J. Econ. (1974), 312, 317 argue that “[…] if we are uncertain about the 
payoff to investment in development, we should err on the side of underinvestment, rather 
than overinvestment, since development is irreversible. Given an ability to learn from 
experience, underinvestment can be remedied […] whereas mistaken overinvestment 
cannot, the consequences persisting in effect for all time.” 
15 ARROW/FISHER (note 14), 319; see also REVESZ/LIVERMORE (note 6), 16-19. 
16 KYSAR (note 5), 92; for further critique of the ‘unprecautionary principle’, see, WENDY E. 
WAGNER, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S., 6 Hum. & 
Ecological Risk Assessment (2000), 459, 466-68; MAHLMANN (note 11), 218. 
17 KYSAR (note 5), 91 (emphasis added). 
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distinction has to be made between calculable risk – risk to which a 
numerical probability can be assigned, and of which the likelihood, direction, 
and magnitude by which actual outcomes may deviate from the estimated 
(mean) risk can also be estimated – and uncertainty, to which a numerical 
probability and distribution cannot be assigned with any confidence that it is 
correct.18 For example, in his essay, “The General Theory of Employment”, 
John Maynard Keynes explained uncertainty as follows: 
“By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to 
distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The 
game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty […]. The 
sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a 
European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of 
interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or 
the position of private wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. 
About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any 
calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.”19 
This distinction is closely intertwined with the notion of simple and com-
plex phenomena which had been discovered by the mathematician Warren 
Weaver and the economist Friedrich A. von Hayek in the course of the last 
century:20  
Simple phenomena consist of few variables which stand in deterministic 
(fixed) relations with one another. The most extreme case involves only two 
variables, of which the state or the change of one is the cause of the state or 
the change of the other. Consequently, as long as one knows the state or the 
change of the causal variable, it is possible to derive a prognosis for the effect 
variable. Further, if the causal variables are controllable, then the effect 
variables can also be controlled. So the first variable depends entirely on the 
second, and not on (a large number of) other factors. Accordingly, the behav-
ior of the first variable can be described with a sufficient degree of precision 
simply by considering its dependency on the second variable, ignoring the 
more trivial effects of other factors. Simple relations of this kind are found 
mainly in the classical natural sciences of the 17th to 20th centuries, e.g. in 
Newton’s laws of mechanics. 
                                                        
18 The distinction is explicit in JOHN M. KEYNES, The General Theory of Employment, 51 Q. 
J. Econ. (1937), 209; see also FRANK H. KNIGHT, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921),19-
20. The term “risk”, as it is usually used in economics refers simply to the probability of 
some event’s occurring, rather than, as is common in ordinary language, referring to the 
probability times the consequence (i.e., the expected cost), as when one says that e.g. 
mountain climbing is risky. 
19 KEYNES (note 18), 213-214. 
20 WARREN WEAVER, Wirtschaft und Komplexität, in 18 ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung 
von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1967), 163. 
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In contrast to that, complex phenomena consist of a large number of vari-
ables which relate to one another in a ‘systematic’ way. These relations are 
not invariant but can change in space and time. The character of such phe-
nomena depends not only upon the attributes and the relative frequency of the 
individual component elements, but also upon the way in which the individ-
ual elements are interconnected. Complexity is a particular characteristic of 
the phenomena studied in economics and the social sciences, but also in such 
disciplines as biology, medicine or psychology. To derive specific predictions 
about certain events in these subject areas, one needs complete information 
on every single element of the phenomenon in question. Thus, the ability to 
make specific and concrete statements about such phenomena would presup-
pose an unattainable amount of knowledge about singular conditions. With-
out this knowledge it is only possible to make what are known as pattern 
predictions; that is to say, what can be learned relates only to certain general 
attributes and to the short- and medium-term direction of the operative proc-
esses, at best. Nevertheless, this knowledge can still be useful in some cases 
for influencing these process attributes and the direction of the process. On 
the other hand, it is impossible to recognize the individual stages of these 
processes in advance, let alone their ultimate outcome. Furthermore, it is 
impossible to obtain prognostic knowledge of the kind that would allow the 
prediction of specific occurrences. 
In current research and applied practice it is common for such complex 
phenomena to be treated as if they were simple phenomena. This is partly 
because, today, the knowledge of simple fixed relations and their application 
for prognosis and control has become the goal of all disciplines and their 
hallmark of quality. A ‘science’ that cannot attain this standard ‘yet’ is 
deemed to be backward. These ‘backward’ sciences attempt to align their 
methods, their interpretation of results and the use of their findings for prog-
nosis and control with conventions from the natural sciences.21 Keynes 
highlighted this phenomenon with respect to maintaining adherence to the 
optimization-policy framework: 
“Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision compels us as 
practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact and to 
behave exactly as we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite 
calculation of a series of prospective advantages and disadvantages, 
                                                        
21 On the reductionist view of neoclassical welfare economics, see, BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 
Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 6 Duke L.J. (1986), 929, 940-941; 
FRANZ WIEACKER, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil des Szientismus in der Rechtswissenschaft, 
in: Dieter Simon (ed.), Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung Ausgewählte Schriften, Band 2, 
Frankfurt a.M.1983, 121; MAHLMANN (note 11), 144-147. 
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each multiplied by its appropriate probability, waiting to be 
summed.”22 
But when it comes to solving complex problems, the relevance of these 
methods is dubious: in the real world, ascertaining all the necessary data to 
capture a complex phenomenon is a difficulty that is virtually insuperable. 
Consequently, if one wants to consider more recent epistemological princi-
ples in regulatory policy, one has to pay due regard to the fact that in the case 
of many of the phenomena subject to risk, environmental, health and safety 
regulation, decision makers should abandon the pretence of actually attempt-
ing to locate and pursue an ‘optimal’ outcome. As these involve the interde-
pendent actions of millions of elements, whose structures are not constant but 
variable in space and time,23 decisionmakers “should present for collective 
consideration an unalloyed depiction of what is, and is not, known about the 
possible consequences of human action, so that the political community can 
consider directly whether it wants to entertain […] irreversible […] harm as 
part of its unique legacy.”24 In other words, if the implications of complexity 
theory are accommodated properly into the scientific models that are used to 
assess costs and benefits, such an accommodation will often mean that scien-
tists are only able to offer a series of qualitatively described scenarios that 
might flow from policy choices, without probability estimates assigned to 
them, rather than quantitatively depicted but ultimately unhelpful cost-benefit 
ranges.25 
IV. Assigning the Burden of Proof According to Real-
World Conditions 
1. Balancing of Interests and the Principle of Proportionality 
The assignment of an implicit burden of proof to regulatory agencies “might 
be appropriate within the ivory towers of the university, where scholars aim 
to bolster the scientific credentials of welfare economics by portraying it as 
the ‘objective implementation of benefit-cost analysis, based on established 
economic theory and empirical research’. In the real world of policy making, 
however, decisions [often] must be made in advance of comprehensive 
knowledge.”26  
                                                        
22 KEYNES (note 18), 214. 
23 WEAVER (note 20), 163. 
24 KYSAR (note 5), 97-98. 
25 CLIVE L. SPASH, Greenhouse Economics: Value and Ethics (2002), 115, 127; KYSAR (note 
5), 97. 
26 KYSAR (note 5), 214-215. 
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As shown above, recent epistemological principles such as uncertainty 
and complexity theory offer possible answers to resolving these problems: 
Regulatory agencies should, in cases of uncertainty, adopt measures that are 
proportionate to the threat perceived and that are open to revision as knowl-
edge develops.27 For the reasons set out, they should not be hampered by a 
default assumption against any kind of government regulation in advance of 
complete scientific demonstration of harm. Consequently, in cases of uncer-
tainty, cost-benefit analysis has to be accompanied by a balancing of interests 
which presupposes 1) identification of potentially negative effects resulting 
from a phenomenon, and 2) a scientific evaluation of the risk which because 
of the insufficiency of the data, its inconclusive or imprecise nature, makes it 
impossible to determine with sufficient certainty the risk in question. When 
an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precau-
tionary measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships 
are not fully established scientifically. This is also true with respect to certain 
financial market operators: as the financial crisis of 2007-2010 has shown, 
there was an ever-present threat of breakdown of the economy which seri-
ously endangered millions of people’s social and economic welfare. 
2. Measures Resulting from Reliance on the Proportionality 
Principle 
In the kind of situations described, the question remains of how decision-
makers have to respond. Above all, they have to decide whether or not to act. 
The appropriate response in a given situation is the result of a political 
decision, a function of the risk level that is ‘acceptable’ to the society on 
which the risk is imposed. For regulatory agencies this problem becomes 
more manageable when, as Professor E. Donald Elliott has suggested, viewed 
diachronically (over time) rather than analytically assessing what relative 
weights should properly be given to facts (risk) and values (precaution) 
synchronically and in the abstract.28 Thus the practical question that every 
regulator in such situations must ask is: 
                                                        
27 ADRIAN KÜNZLER, Economic Content of Competition Law: In Defense of a Reality-Based 
Approach to Competition Policy, ASCOLA Competition Law Series 2011 (forthcoming 
2011); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Communication from the 
commission on the precautionary principle (2000), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ health_consumer 
/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf. As examples the deregulation of formerly strictly regulated 
industry sectors such as telecommunication, mail and railroad services can be mentioned. 
On the political agenda in Switzerland is the deregulation of the agricultural markets, see, 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 27, 2011, 15 (RUDOLF MINSCH, Öffnung des Agrarmarktes ist 
im Gesamtinteresse des Landes and MATTHIAS BINSWANGER, Nicht die Schweizer Bauern 
aufs Spiel setzen). 
28 E. DONALD ELLIOTT, Global Climate Change and Regulatory Uncertainty 9 Ariz. J. Int’l 
Comp. L. (1992), 259, 261. 
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“Shall I act to address this particular problem now, basing my decision 
on what is currently known (or, more accurately, believed to be 
known)? Or shall I instead defer action until a later date, when more 
may be known, but at the cost of what occurs in the meantime?”29 
Viewed from this practical, diachronic perspective – which is the situation 
that a regulator actually faces in trying to decide on concrete actions – the 
problem of the relative weights to be assigned to fact (risk) and to value 
(precaution) may become much more tractable: 
“As a matter of common sense, a regulator may be well advised to wait 
until later to act if, but only if, (a) it seems unlikely that much 
preventable harm will occur in the meantime, but (b) it also seems 
likely that enough useful information will be developed in the 
meantime so that making a better decision in the future will be 
substantially less difficult than it is today.”30 
However, as far as financial market regulation is concerned the complex-
ity and inherent uncertainty of the economy will often require market regula-
tors – for precautionary reasons – to act. 
3. Nature of the Action Ultimately Taken 
With respect to maximizing overall welfare, the implicit assumption by cost-
benefit analysis that the inevitable uncertainty described must be construed 
against government interventions is based on the grounds that according to 
the purely price-based concept of ‘social or economic welfare’ of neoclassical 
welfare-economics ‘in case of doubt’ overall well-being cannot be enhanced 
by interfering with individual preferences.  
However, a balancing of interests in such cases – as opposed to cost-
benefit analysis – involves making value-judgments which affect legally 
protected interests. And by no means must these value-judgments necessarily 
correspond to the values of welfare economics. Rather, such value-judgments 
might be prescribed in the constitution and in a particular statute by the 
legislator. In case of doubt, these must be respected and applied to the con-
crete case when the balancing test is carried out.31 Moreover, in cases of 
doubt, a ‘balancing of interests’ may add a second and a third dimension to 
the linear, one-dimensional decisionmaking system that is assumed by an 
                                                        
29 ORTWIN RENN/E. DONALD ELLIOTT, Chemical Regulation in the United States and Europe, 
in: The Reality of Precaution: Comparing Risk Regulation in the United States and Europe 
(forthcoming 2011). 
30 RENN/ELLIOTT (note 29). 
31 A notion that has been referred to as ‘environmental constitutionalism’, see, KYSAR (note 
5), 229-254. 
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approach according to which economic conditions are translated predictably 
into economic conclusions that call for prescribed economic measures, and 
environmental conditions can be translated predictably into environmental 
conclusions that call for environmental measures, and so forth.32 And al-
though such a ‘balancing of interests’ is an expression of the general princi-
ple of proportionality, which is particularly significant in relation to the 
restriction of basic rights in constitutional law, these kinds of interference 
with the preferences of those concerned are widely acknowledged in ‘reality-
based economics’.33 
One of the main aims of this kind of governmental regulation is to bring 
interventions in individual preferences in line with the goal of reducing ‘false 
positives’ and ‘false negatives’, i.e. with the goal of maximizing macrosocie-
tal welfare. At the same time, it allows for decision-making criteria which do 
justice to real-world conditions.34  
V. Concluding Remarks 
This contribution is not a petition against cost-benefit analysis but a plea for 
the application of reality-based economic concepts and analysis methods. 
The underlying hypothesis of cost-benefit analysis that economic welfare can 
only be measured on the scale of ‘economic efficiency’, is not unreservedly 
tenable. And it is reasonably clear that this no longer reflects the ‘majority 
view’ within economics, either. In fact, it is now well recognized in the 
discipline of economics that social and economic welfare is not conceptually 
limited to material values, that outcomes are not always predictable, and that 
the states of equilibrium studied by the neoclassical economists sometimes 
bear little resemblance to the complexity and uncertainty of reality.  
However, once it is borne in mind that a more ‘reality-based approach’ 
resorts to a variety of epistemological principles, on closer examination there 
is far less of a discrepancy between a reality-based regulatory policy and 
scientific advances than when neoclassical welfare economics is taken as an 
absolute standard. As stated at the outset, ‘reality-based economics’ is not as 
unified as neoclassical welfare economics, but that is an advantage rather 
than a disadvantage, because it means that different theories can be used to 
explain different aspects of the subject matter.  
                                                        
32 KYSAR (note 5), 71. 
33 See COLIN F. CAMERER/SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF/GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN/TED O’DONOG-
HUE/MATTHEW RABIN, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case 
for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. (2003), 1211, 1211-1212. 
34 Id., 1221; CHRISTINE JOLLS, Governing America: The Emergence of Behavioral Law and 
Economics, Max Weber Lecture Series, 2010, 1-4, http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/ 
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